Buying Teams
Andres Sawicki*
The Sixth Annual Berle Symposium reflects on Margaret Blair and
Lynn Stout’s classic article: A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law. Blair and Stout recast the modern law of public corporations
through the lens of the team production theory of the firm. Here, I apply
Blair and Stout’s insights—emphasizing the value of team production,
independent monitors, and intellectual property rights—to a novel corporate transaction structure: the acqui-hire.
In an acqui-hire, a publicly owned technology firm wants to add a
start-up’s engineers. Instead of simply hiring them, though, it buys the
start-up, discards most of its assets, and retains the start-up’s engineers.
These transactions are puzzling because, even though the buyer is ostensibly interested only in hiring the start-up’s engineers, some of the compensation is nonetheless diverted to the start-up’s investors.
The only existing analysis of acqui-hires in the legal literature argues that cooperative norms in Silicon Valley are the primary driver of
these transactions. While that analysis sheds useful light on important
aspects of these deals, it underplays the importance of intellectual property, especially patents. Patents can facilitate the organization of team
production in several ways, including by increasing the costs to team
members of leaving the team. Large technology firms cannot acquire
those patent rights by simply hiring the start-up’s engineers; instead, they
must buy the start-up itself. Patent law is therefore a partial driver of the
choice to pursue an acqui-hire because it enables the buyer to obtain assets useful in team production. A preliminary investigation using a novel
dataset of sixty-three acqui-hires during the years 2011 and 2012 supports this proposition. The investigation reveals that, contrary to the pat-
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tern for all of the start-up’s other assets, existing and future patent rights
typically follow the engineers to the buyer.
I. INTRODUCTION
In their landmark article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout applied the insights of the team production theory of the firm to develop a descriptive and normative theory
of corporate law.1 The team production theory takes as its starting point a
production process in which several inputs are combined, the inputs
make team-specific investments, and the gains from the production are
nonseparable.2 The scope of team production theory thus includes much
of the work of American public corporations, which are the focus of A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law.3 But not all production processes are best understood in team production terms. Closely held organizations, for example, may be better described by the property rights theory of the firm. 4 Scholars building on Blair and Stout’s contribution
should therefore begin their analyses by identifying production processes
for which the team production theory offers the most useful frame.5
One potentially fruitful place to look for these kinds of production
processes is in the fields regulated by intellectual property law. 6 The
classic vision of intellectual property is that of an individual working
alone to produce expressive works or inventions—in other words, the
romantic ideal of the sole author or inventor.7 But this vision does not
accurately depict the real world of creative production. Instead, creative
1. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
2. Id. at 249.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 272–73.
5. See Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards, 38 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 619 (2015) (arguing that team production theory can help explain the structure of at least
some private company boards).
6. I use the phrase “intellectual property law” here to refer to copyright and patent law (and, to
a lesser extent, trade secret law), in line with other scholars who focus on the laws regulating the
production of expressive works and inventions. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2014).
7. See Mario Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte’s Proof of the Illegality of
Reprinting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1847–48 (2011) (“The ‘romantic author’ or ‘romantic
genius’ has been central to the history and critique of copyright for a few decades now.”); id. at
1847–48 nn.1–2 (citing sources supporting and critiquing the centrality of the romantic author);
Christopher Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 52, 57–61 (2009) (describing the historical influence of the individual inventor motif on patent law, particularly in the legislative and administrative branches); Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 907–21 (2002) (describing genesis of heroic inventor motif
and influence on early patent law).
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people frequently collaborate to produce creative works,8 and this production is plagued by the problems described by team production theorists.9
In a prior work with Anthony Casey, we explored these sorts of
team production problems in fields that are regulated by copyright law.10
Consider, for example, a movie. Each actor must spend time reading the
script and internalizing the characters’ motivations, history, and so on.
Although there may be some spillover to other movies in which the actor
undertakes similar roles or otherwise performs similar work, the bulk of
this time is a team-specific investment—it creates much more value for
this project than for any other. Each actor’s investment must also be
combined with the others’ investments. And at the end of the project, it
will be difficult to tell who is responsible for each part of the total value
of the finished film. This is precisely the scenario contemplated by the
team production theory of the firm. Copyright law’s ownership rules
(like the “work made for hire” doctrine11) and scope rules (like the derivative works right12) therefore affect participants’ ability to solve these
problems using the organizational solutions proposed by team production
theorists.13
Team production problems are also likely pervasive in the fields
regulated by patent law. Consider the development of a new drug.14 Drug
development requires joint contributions by people with diverse expertise,
including chemists, molecular biologists, and clinicians. Each of these
individuals will invest time and resources producing information that is
most useful to the development of this drug, and much less useful to the
8. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012).
9. See Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683
(2013) (applying the insights of team production theory to explain the effect of copyright law on the
organization of the creative industries); see id. at 1700 (team production problems include difficulty
(1) observing team members’ performance, (2) verifying to outsiders team members’ (non)compliance with agreements, (3) attributing output value to particular inputs, and (4) predicting
total output value).
10. See generally id.
11. The “work made for hire” doctrine vests ownership in the person who hired the author of a
copyrighted work when either: (1) the author is an employee working within the scope of her employment, or (2) the work is a within a statutorily-identified category and there is a written agreement specifying that the work is a work made for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (defining a work
made for hire); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1723 (explaining the work made for hire rules).
12. The “derivative works right” grants to the owner of the copyright in an original work the
right to also make new works “based upon” the original. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2010), 106(2) (2002)
(defining the derivative works right); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1726 (describing the derivative works right).
13. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1712–39.
14. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 265–67 (explaining why drug development likely poses
team production problems).
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development of any other drug. The end product—a new drug—will be
the result of their joint contributions, and it will be difficult to ascertain
the degree to which any one individual is responsible for the joint output.
Legal academics have so far overlooked the team production theory
of the firm as a source of insight into patent law’s effects on the organization of innovative activity;15 the recent Silicon Valley trend of acquihiring may be a catalyst for further research on these issues. An acquihire is a transaction in which a large technology company (the buyer)16
purchases a start-up with the primary purpose of employing the start-up’s
engineers; the buyer is not interested in the start-up’s existing projects,
customer relationships, or other corporate assets.17 The start-ups are involved in innovative activity ostensibly regulated by patent law.18 And in
the course of the acqui-hire, the engineers—the core innovative employees involved in team production activities—move from a closely held
firm to a large public corporation. An exploration of the acqui-hire may
therefore yield useful insights into the interaction of teams, patents, and
corporate law.
The motives underlying a firm’s choice to pursue an acqui-hire are
not immediately clear. In an acqui-hire, a portion of the purchase price is
split among the start-up’s equity holders. These equity holders include
not only the engineers, who are the source of the buyer’s interest in the
transaction, but also venture capitalists, angel investors, and early nonengineer employees who have earned some form of equity compensation.
The acqui-hire thus presents a puzzle: if the acquiring company simply
wants to add the start-up’s engineers, why does it bother purchasing the

15. For two exceptions to this general neglect, see Paul J. Heald, A Transactions Cost Theory
of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 487–98 (2005) (arguing that patents can help facilitate organizational solutions to team production problems), and Robert Merges, The Law and Economics of
Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20–26 (1999) (using team production theory to
justify corporate ownership of employee inventions). There is a growing literature using other theories of the firm—notably the property-rights theory of the firm—to explore these and related issues.
See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1687 n.14 (citing sources).
16. For ease of exposition, I will use the term “buyer” to refer to the firm to which the engineers go, even in scenarios like a group hire where, strictly speaking, the firm is not “buying” anything. I will also use the term “start-up” to refer to the firm the engineers are leaving, and the term
“engineers” to refer to the computer programmers that the buyer is recruiting.
17. See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 283 (2013).
18. The patentability of software has not always been accepted. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A.
Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2001)
(recounting the history of courts deciding software patentability questions). The Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed that at least some software patents claim patentable subject matter, although the
proper scope of such patents remains unclear. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347
(2014).
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start-up instead of pursuing a group hire?19 In an ordinary group hire, the
purchase price would be shared only among the engineers, who comprise
the primary asset of interest to the buyer. If the equity holders have no
claim to the asset motivating the transaction, then why are they sharing
in the total price being paid by the buyer?
The only existing legal academic analysis of acqui-hires argues that
Silicon Valley norms provide most of the explanatory power for the increasing prevalence of this transaction structure.20 In their intriguing article, Professors Coyle and Polsky explain that the engineer-founders of
the start-ups could leave as a group and join the buyer without fear of
legal consequences. 21 This is because California law severely restricts
noncompete agreements and because spurned Silicon Valley investors
strongly prefer not to sue the entrepreneurs they have backed.22 But the
engineer-founders nonetheless agree to structure their moves as acquihires largely to avoid informal sanctions that their investors could impose
if those investors were unhappy with the way in which the venture
wound down.23 This desire to avoid informal sanctions is buttressed by
(1) the reputational benefits engineers receive from being able to say
their start-up was sold; (2) Silicon Valley’s cooperative legal culture; (3)
the engineers’ underestimation of the financial costs of the acqui-hire;
and (4) tax considerations that reduce the actual financial costs of the
acqui-hire to the engineers.24
The role of intellectual property in the acqui-hire phenomenon,
however, remains ambiguous. In a prototypical acqui-hire, the buyer
does not acquire any of the start-up’s assets, whether tangible (like facilities and equipment) or intangible (like customer lists and goodwill).25
But the attorneys, engineers, and investors who participated in acquihires—and formed the basis for Coyle and Polsky’s analysis—provide
conflicting descriptions of what happens to the start-up’s intellectual
19. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 301 (posing the “existential puzzle” of the acqui-hire).
20. Id. at 312–19. Coyle and Polsky limit the scope of their claims to Silicon Valley start-ups
acquired by California firms because much of their analysis depends on norms particular to that
region and the law of that state. Id. at 286 n.12. Because my interest lies in the possibility that legal
rights—specifically, patent rights—might interact with team production value to contribute to the
use of this kind of transaction, I do not so limit my analysis. Of course, many of the start-ups in the
data presented here are in fact Silicon Valley start-ups acquired by California firms. It is nonetheless
worth emphasizing that at least part of the reason why the story here diverges from the Coyle and
Polsky story is this difference in scope.
21. Id. at 302–10.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 312–19.
24. Id. at 320–31.
25. Id. at 293–94.
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property.26 I aim to address the resulting uncertainty by answering two
questions: what happens to the patents in an acqui-hire? And why?
As to the first question, patents tend to follow the engineers from
the start-up to the buyer. I report here the results of a preliminary investigation of the patent rights associated with a set of acqui-hires completed
by several large technology firms between 2011 and 2012.27 Because the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) maintains a publicly accessible database of patent assignments, it is possible to track the patents and applications that have been transferred from the start-ups to the buyers in these acqui-hires.28 Using this information, I show that the near-universal
pattern in an acqui-hire is for the start-up’s patent rights to follow the
engineers to the buyer. Although this data is preliminary and subject to a
number of caveats, it at least suggests that patents play some nontrivial
role in the acqui-hire phenomenon.
Answering the second question—why does this pattern prevail—is
more difficult. It is possible, for example, that the patents can serve a
defensive role for the buyer (which may be a target for vexatious litigation) that they cannot serve for the start-up (which will soon cease operations). Another hypothesis is that patents have team-specific value.29 Patents may serve as a mechanism for mitigating the shirking problems endemic in team production contexts. They can do so by, among other
things, raising the costs to team members who defect from the team. If
patents serve this function, then it is sensible for buyers to prefer acquihires to group hires—the former facilitates the buyer’s acquisition of
team-preserving patents and the latter does not. Although the data here
do not permit us to choose between these two hypotheses, they do make
it unlikely that patents are irrelevant to acqui-hires.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the acqui-hire
transaction and reviews the leading legal academic theory for why they
occur. Part III briefly explains patent ownership rules in the start-up context, and then presents the data from this preliminary investigation into
the patterns of patent assignments in acqui-hires. Part III also offers a
potential explanation for that pattern. Part IV concludes with some suggestions for further research.

26. Id. at 293 n.38.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 102–15.
28. Because of confidentiality rules regarding pending patent applications and because not all
patent assignments are recorded, the data presented here likely understates the role of patents in
acqui-hires. See infra text accompanying notes 156–60.
29. See Heald, supra note 15, at 487–98; Merges, supra note 15, at 20–26; infra text accompanying notes 133–40.
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM REGARDING ACQUI-HIRES
Firms regularly acquire other firms. In an ordinary acquisition, the
buyer wants to purchase the seller’s assets, which can include tangible
things, like factories or real property, or intangible things, like customer
relationships.30 In these scenarios, the buyer and seller can agree to structure the transaction in a number of ways.31 What these transactions have
in common is that the buyer obtains all (or substantially all) of the seller’s business.
In other instances, a firm is only interested in hiring some or all of
another firm’s at-will employees. 32 When this occurs, the buyer approaches the employees whom it wishes to hire, either individually or as
a group. If they are satisfied with the offered terms, the employees leave
their current employer and go work for the buyer. Because the employees
are at-will, the current employer does not have a say in whether the
transaction occurs or not.33 I will refer to these scenarios as group hires.
The technology industry has recently begun engaging in a third
kind of transaction: the acqui-hire.34 In an acqui-hire, the buyer has the
same motivation as it does in a group hire—it wants to hire another
firm’s at-will employees.35 But instead of simply hiring those employees,
the buyer structures the transaction as an ordinary acquisition, purchasing
all of the other firm’s business and assets. Once the buyer does so,
though, it discards the acquired firm’s assets, and keeps only the employees in which it was interested.36
In these transactions, the buyer is usually a large technology company, like Google or Facebook.37 The desired at-will employees are the
engineers of a start-up.38 The transaction typically occurs either between
30. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 293.
31. The most common forms are asset purchases, stock purchases, and mergers. See John C.
Coates IV, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Restructuring, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LAW
GOVERNANCE
(forthcoming
2014)
(manuscript
at
3–7),
available
at
AND
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463251.
32. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 301.
33. When the employees have employment contracts with the seller firm, that transforms their
employment into something other than at-will, and the seller firm will have a say in whether the
employees leave to join the buyer.
34. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 293–301.
35. Id. at 293–94.
36. Id. at 293–97.
37. Id. at 283; Miguel Heft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest to Corral Young Talent, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A1.
38. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 283–84; see also Dan Bobkoff, Employee Shopping:
‘Acqui-Hire’ Is the New Normal in Silicon Valley, NPR (Sept. 24, 2012, 3:23 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/09/25/161573307/employee-shopping-acqui-hireis-the-new-normal-in-silicon-valley.
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the seed funding and Series A financing rounds, or between the Series A
and Series B financing rounds; this is because that is usually the point
when it becomes clear that the start-up is unlikely to successfully launch
a product before it runs out of financing.39 Even though the engineers are
at-will employees, and therefore free to leave even without their employer’s consent, the buyer chooses to purchase the start-up.40
As a result, the price the buyer pays to obtain the engineers’ services is split in two.41 One part—called the compensation pool—is distributed to the newly hired engineers.42 A second part—called the deal
consideration pool—is distributed to the start-up’s shareholders.43 These
shareholders typically include not only the engineers (who are often
granted stock options during the early stages of the firm’s life), but also
other early employees, angel investors, and venture capitalists. 44 Although the precise forms of the two pools vary, 45 the common thread
through all acqui-hires is the existence of these two separate pools.
As mentioned above, the acqui-hire thus presents a puzzle: if the
only asset of interest to the buyer is the future employment of the startup’s engineers, then why is any money being distributed to the start-up’s
shareholders?46 We can start with the premise that the buyer values adding the engineers in an amount equal to the combined value of the deal
consideration and the compensation pool because this is the total amount
that the buyer spends to add the engineers.47 The existence of a compensation pool is no surprise—the buyer has to pay the engineers some
amount to convince the engineers to work for the buyer, and the compensation pool represents that amount. It is the existence of the deal consideration pool that is puzzling. If the buyer values the engineers in an
amount equal to the compensation pool plus the deal consideration pool,

39. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 295.
40. Id. at 296–97.
41. Id. at 297.
42. Id. at 297–98.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 297.
45. Id. at 296–98 (describing variations in the details of acqui-hires).
46. Id. at 301 n.75.
47. The buyer evidently values the future employment at the total purchase price (compensation pool plus deal consideration pool), so the seller’s employees should be able to negotiate for that
amount. On the other hand, the seller’s employees are willing to leave the seller for just the compensation pool (plus whatever percentage of the deal consideration pool they are entitled to as shareholders of the seller firm), so the buyer should be able to convince them to join the seller firm for
just the compensation pool amount. As a result, we should expect the buyer and the seller’s employees to negotiate some split of the deal consideration pool that is sent to the seller’s shareholders in an
acqui-hire.
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the engineers should be able to obtain more than just the compensation
pool.48 Why is money being diverted to the start-up’s shareholders?
Shareholders typically do not have rights to the assets the buyer
values: the engineers’ future employment services. While a firm’s shareholders could have claims to the labor of its employees if the firm has
fixed-term employment or noncompete agreements with the employees,
start-up engineers do not ordinarily sign fixed-term employment agreements.49 Moreover, California law refuses to enforce noncompetes.50 Because the start-up’s shareholders generally have no legal claims to the
asset of interest, the buyer and the engineers could presumably agree to
split the value of the deal consideration pool, rather than sharing it with
the seller’s shareholders.51 What, then, drives the existence and increasing popularity of this hybrid transaction structure?
According to Coyle and Polsky, several factors combine to make
the acqui-hire a more attractive proposition than an ordinary acquisition
or a group hire. The most important factor is a set of social norms among
participants in the Silicon Valley technology industry. 52 In the typical
acqui-hire, the start-up’s employees are not ordinary rank-and-file employees; instead, they are engineers who were either the company’s
founders or among the first employees hired by those founderengineers. 53 Furthermore, the start-up’s shareholders are usually some
combination of angel investors, venture capitalists, and employee shareholders (who received their equity as compensation during the early
stages of the firm’s life).54 The start-up’s departing employees thus usually have intimate relationships with the start-up’s shareholders, and it is
these relationships that help explain why some start-ups prefer an acquihire to a group hire.

48. To be precise, the engineers do ordinarily receive some of the deal consideration pool to
the extent that the engineers are also shareholders. But the point in the text remains—some significant portion of the deal consideration pool goes to people other than the engineers, and because
those people do not own any assets of interest to the buyer, it seems that the engineers should receive
all of that pool, or at least split it with the buyer, rather than share it with others.
49. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 304–05.
50. See CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2014); Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP,
189 P.3d 285, 288 (Cal. 2008); Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 303–04.
51. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 301 & n.75 (analyzing how the value of the transaction would be split between the buyer and the engineers in a group hire).
52. Id. at 311.
53. Id. at 286 n.10.
54. See id. at 287–88 (noting that start-up capital typically comes from venture capitalists and
angel investors); id. at 289 (stating that founders and employees usually own common stock in the
start-up as part of their compensation); id. at 297 (explaining that the deal consideration is paid to
“the start-up’s outside investors and its employee shareholders”).
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The relationships between the start-up’s engineers and its shareholders allow unhappy shareholders to impose at least two kinds of informal sanctions that might encourage the engineers to pursue an acquihire rather than a group hire.55 First, it is likely that the departing engineers will at some future date seek to start another new firm and will
need financing to do so.56 If the engineers left the start-up via a group
hire, the spurned investors of the earlier venture would almost surely refuse to finance the engineers’ new venture.57 Moreover, because Silicon
Valley venture capitalists seek references from the venture capitalists
who funded an entrepreneur’s prior firm, the spurned investors can further punish the departing engineers by providing a negative reference, or
at least refusing to provide a positive one.58 This kind of informal sanction thus makes it more difficult for departing engineers to pursue entrepreneurial projects in the future.
Second, unhappy investors may impose nonfinancial social penalties on departing engineers. 59 Because the investors and engineers are
often members of the same communities, the investors can lower the engineers’ social standing by doing things like refusing to invite the engineers to community events they host (ranging from birthday parties to
charity balls) or telling neighbors that the engineers treated the investors
badly.60 The prospect of these social penalties—and the lowered status
that comes with them—may be another factor pushing engineers towards
acqui-hires and away from group hires. And even though the precise
rules that engineers must follow in order to avoid these sanctions are unclear, 61 Silicon Valley lawyers may inculcate in their clients a
nonadversarial attitude, leading them to pursue the cooperative acquihire rather than the non-cooperative group hire.62
In addition to the informal sanctions unhappy shareholders could
impose, intrinsic motivations may also constrain engineers from pursuing
group hires even when a group hire offers a larger financial payoff than
an acqui-hire.63 Engineers might, for example, feel a sense of loyalty to
the investors who first backed the venture because those investors recog55. Id. at 314.
56. Id. at 314–15.
57. Id. at 315–17.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 319.
60. Id. at 319 & n.151.
61. See id. at 332–36 (arguing that although there is no “standard norm” regarding how much
money the investors should receive, there will eventually develop a “money back for the investors”
rule of thumb).
62. Id. at 324–26.
63. Id. at 317–19.
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nized the value of the engineers’ ideas while others did not.64 They may
also feel a desire to be viewed as acting fairly or doing the right thing.65
Although the engineers’ willingness to split the proceeds with the
start-up’s shareholders is the core puzzle in the acqui-hire, it is also
worth considering why the buyer would be willing to structure the transaction in this way. After all, if the buyer and the engineers could cut out
the shareholders, they could split the gains from doing so. The informal
sanctions the shareholders could impose suggest a connection between
the buyer’s motivation for entering into an acqui-hire and Blair and
Stout’s vision of the board as a mediating hierarch. Blair and Stout argue
that one role of the board is to distribute the surplus created by the team
to the corporation’s many stakeholders. 66 Those stakeholders may include not only the corporation’s shareholders and employees, but also the
corporation’s customers or members of the community in which the corporation operates.67 In an acqui-hire, the buyer’s board is authorizing a
distribution of the buyer’s surplus to the start-up’s investors. As Blair
and Stout suggest, it is plausible to think of the start-up’s investors as
also being among the buyer’s stakeholders. This is because the investors—the venture capital firms—play a key role in the larger Silicon Valley ecosystem that is crucial to the success of all Silicon Valley firms.68
To be sure, not all acqui-hires are board-approved decisions—corporate
development departments can complete some of these transactions without board input so long as the price of the acquisition is sufficiently
low.69 Still, when the board does authorize these transactions, it appears
to be acting in precisely the way that Blair and Stout suggest it should.
Another possibility centers on the future relationships between the
start-up’s engineers and the buyer’s current employees.70 The engineers
who are going to work with the buyer will often have richer compensa64. Id. at 317–18.
65. Id. at 318–19.
66. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 321 (justifying corporate law as “designed to protect the
corporate coalition by allowing directors to allocate rents among various stakeholders” (emphasis
added)); id. at 325 (arguing that the returns to stakeholders are determined in part by political considerations).
67. See id. at 278, 288 (including “the local community” as among the stakeholders in most
public corporations); id. at 300–01, 307–09 (arguing that corporate law permits the board to consider
the impact of corporate decisions on the community).
68. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 322–23. Venture capital firms provide the funding that
attracts entrepreneurial engineers to Silicon Valley. See id. at 292–93. The resulting concentration of
engineering talent helps satisfy the staffing needs of the large technology firms in the region. See id.
at 290–91.
69. I thank Elizabeth Pollman for raising this issue.
70. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 323.
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tion packages than employees who had been working at the buyer prior
to their arrival. The difference in compensation is a source of potential
friction between the engineers and other employees. By structuring and
labeling the addition of those engineers as an acquisition, rather than as a
group hire, the buyer can justify the difference in compensation as owing
to its purchase of the engineers’ start-up.71 There is again a connection to
Blair and Stout’s vision of the board as a mediating hierarch: the decision
to adopt the acqui-hire transaction is part of the board’s effort to avoid
disputes among team members (i.e., the buyer’s current engineers and
the start-up’s engineers that will be joining the buyer’s team).72
Although the preceding factors are the primary drivers of the acquihire trend, there are some secondary drivers as well. Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial culture may hold engineers who sell their firms in higher
social esteem; therefore, engineers would prefer transactions that look
like sales (e.g., an acqui-hire) over those that don’t (e.g., a group hire).73
The engineers’ perceived cost of doing an acqui-hire instead of a group
hire may be lower than its actual cost because—in line with the predictions of prospect theory—the cost can be framed as a forgone gain, rather
than as an out-of-pocket loss.74 And because at least some of the compensation in an acqui-hire will take the form of a capital gain (instead of
being all wage income as it would in a group hire), the engineers can reduce their tax burden by pursuing an acqui-hire rather than a group

71. Id. It is not clear, though, why this strategy should work for very long. The risk in a group
hire is that the buyer’s existing engineers will resent the richer compensation packages the buyer
offers the start-up’s engineers and will chafe at the notion of newcomers being paid more than they
are paid to do the same work. When the buyer points to the acqui-hire as its justification, it is signaling to its existing engineers that the start-up’s engineers are not being paid only to do the same work;
they are also being paid for the start-up’s assets. But recall that the central feature of the acqui-hire is
that the buyer does not value the start-up’s assets and will not in fact acquire them, leaving them
instead with the start-up’s investors. The buyer’s existing engineers should notice that the buyer is
not in fact retaining the additional assets it is pointing to as justification for offering the start-up’s
engineers richer compensation. So it seems that the buyer’s engineers should soon see through this
distraction.
72. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 276–82.
73. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 320–22.
74. Id. at 327–28; see generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Prospect theory holds that people
are risk averse with respect to potential gains, which causes them to value potential gains below their
expected value. Moreover, people are risk seeking with respect to potential losses, which causes
them to value potential losses above their expected value. Finally, whether an outcome is viewed as
a potential gain or a potential loss is dependent on framing effects. In the acqui-hire context, the
engineers will treat the cost of an acqui-hire as less than its actual cost because they will likely view
the compensation diverted to the investors as a forgone gain, for which they will act in a risk-averse
manner (i.e., they will value it at less than its expected value).
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hire.75 According to Coyle and Polsky, this combination of factors largely explains the choice to pursue an acqui-hire.
III. START-UPS, TEAMS, AND PATENTS
The value of hiring a team, as opposed to an equivalent number of
individual engineers, appears insufficient on its own to explain the acquihire trend. This is because the buyer could “recruit and hire a team of atwill employees away from another company through the normal hiring
channels.”76 That is, the buyer could add the team through a group hire.
Moreover, even in an acqui-hire, “the desired employees and the buyer
will have to negotiate the individual compensation packages on a personby-person basis.”77 In other words, there appear to be no negotiating efficiencies from adding the team via an acqui-hire rather than a group hire.
Therefore, even if the team has a value larger than that of an equivalent
number of individuals, the choice to structure the transaction as an acquihire has nothing to do with that value.
Still, there are unanswered questions about the movement of the
start-up’s intellectual property in an acqui-hire that might indicate that
teams do matter. The acqui-hire is distinguished from an ordinary acquisition by the fact that the buyer is not interested in the start-up’s tangible
or intangible assets. 78 Instead, the assets revert to the start-up’s investors.79 It is unclear, however, whether this pattern holds true for the startup’s intellectual property. Intellectual property assets—which include
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets—are intangible assets
of the start-up. Following the simple story of the acqui-hire, the startup’s intellectual property should revert to the start-up’s investors.
In at least some instances, though, it appears that the buyer in an
acqui-hire obtains the start-up’s patents.80 Coyle and Polsky’s analysis is
based on a series of interviews with acqui-hire participants.81 Those participants are divided on the role of patents in these transactions. Some
view patents as potentially valuable assets that the buyer wishes to acquire; others suggest that patents revert to the start-up just like the startup’s other assets; and still others indicate that the patents are kept by the
75. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 329–31.
76. Id. at 302.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 293.
79. Id. at 296 n.53.
80. Id. at 293 n.38; see also id. at 296 (noting that often, in larger acqui-hires, “the only assets
acquired by the purchaser are whatever intellectual property rights that the startup owns; other assets . . . are left behind”).
81. Id. at 285.
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buyer for defensive purposes (e.g., to limit the risk of an infringement
suit that might arise if the patents fell into the hands of a competitor).82
The first task in sharpening the picture of the acqui-hire is therefore to
determine what actually happens to the start-up’s intellectual property
when its engineers are acqui-hired.
A. What Happens to the Start-up’s Intellectual Property?
The start-up’s intellectual property potentially encompasses patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. Because patents offer protection for the core technological developments produced by the start-up,
and because relevant data is publicly accessible, the start-up’s patents
offer a window through which to begin looking at the role of intellectual
property in the acqui-hire.83 The pattern of patent transactions offers potential insight into the choice to structure a transaction as an acqui-hire
because—assuming the buyer wants the patents—it must pursue an
acqui-hire, rather than a group hire, to obtain them. This is because the
start-up’s investors likely have plausible legal claims to the patentable
inventions produced by its engineers. Moreover, third parties could rely
on those claims to the buyer’s detriment if the buyer failed to obtain
them, weakening the buyer’s ability to rely on the reciprocal norms identified by Coyle and Polsky. The buyer accordingly needs the start-up’s
investors to agree to transfer those claims—which may rest on existing
patents, pending patent applications, or future patent applications—to the
buyer.
There are several potentially plausible sources for the investors’
claims to the start-up’s inventions. In the simplest scenario, the start-up’s
investors can have claims to existing patents. These claims will arise
from inventions that have been produced by the start-up’s engineers, and
for which the start-up or the engineers have applied for and received a
patent. Patent law requires that every patent identify a natural person as
the inventor.84 The inventor is the person who first conceives of the in-

82. Id. at 293 n.38.
83. Looking at patents does not offer a complete picture of the role of intellectual property in
the acqui-hire because, among other things, these kinds of start-ups may rely more heavily on
appropriability mechanisms other than patents. Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1290–93 (2009). Moreover, the publicly
accessible data is likely incomplete. Id. at 1274. Still, because of the ease of access to data, this is an
appropriate place to begin the analysis and identify avenues for future research.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2013) (“An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be
made, by the inventor . . . .”); 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.01 (2012).
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vention.85 Joint invention by more than one person is possible; corporate
invention, however, is not.86
Although the patent must identify the individual inventors, patent
law permits those inventors to assign their rights to others, including corporations.87 Patents are treated as personal property,88 and patent assignments are generally governed by state contract law. 89 California does
enforce invention assignment agreements.90 However, these agreements
cannot cover an invention made by the employee on her own time and
without using the employer’s resources, unless the invention relates to
the employer’s business or results from the employee’s work for the employer. 91 Nearly all start-ups use these kinds of invention assignment
agreements, granting the start-up the patent rights to any invention produced by its employees during the course of and within the scope of their
employment.92 As a result, although the patents presumptively belong to
the engineers, invention assignment agreements usually make the startup the owner of the patents.93 If the buyer wants both the engineers and

85. Conception is achieved when someone has in their mind all of the elements of the invention.
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (summarizing the
requirements of inventorship); Merges, supra note 15, at 47–48 (explaining that although conception
is a “mental event,” it requires objective proof, and the inventor can therefore manipulate the timing
of conception).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012) (“When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly,
they shall apply for patent jointly . . . .”); Edwards v. Gramling Eng’g Corp., 588 A.2d 793, 798 (Md.
1991) (“It is generally recognized that ‘[c]orporations . . . cannot apply as such for a patent.’”).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013) (“[P]atents . . . shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.”); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195
(2011) (“[A]n inventor can assign his rights in an invention to a third party.”).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013) (providing that “patents shall have the attributes of personal property”); FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he [relevant]
statutes establish . . . that patents today have the attributes of personal property.”).
89. Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., 109 F.3d 1567, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
federal court did not have jurisdiction to decide claims arising out of breach of patent assignment
agreements because such agreements are governed by state contract law).
90. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2870(a) (West 2014); Cadence Design Sys. v. Bhandari, No. C 0700823 MHP, 2007 WL 3343085, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2007); Parker A. Howell, Whose Invention Is It Anyway? Employee Invention-Assignment Agreements and Their Limits, 8 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 79, 90 (2012).
91. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2870(a) (West 2014); Howell, supra note 90, at 90.
92. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 305 n.88 (noting prevalence of invention assignment
agreements); Merges, supra note 15, at 7–10 (describing the use of invention assignment agreements,
and state law limits on them).
93. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195
(2011) (“Our precedents confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933) (“The respective rights
and obligations of employer and employee, touching an invention conceived by the latter, spring
from the contract of employment.”).
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the patents they produced while at the start-up, then the buyer will need
to obtain those patents from the start-up’s shareholders.
Turn now to pending patent applications. Many acqui-hires occur
within the first few years of the firm’s founding.94 The patent application
process, meanwhile, typically runs between two to three years.95 These
timelines suggest that any patent applications that a start-up filed may
still be pending at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) when a potential buyer is deciding whether to do a group hire or an acqui-hire. Suppose, for example, that it took two years for the acqui-hire target to invent the patentable technology and it files for a patent as soon as it invents. If the firm is the subject of an acqui-hire one year later, the application will likely still be pending.
Like issued patents, pending applications can be assigned by contract.96 As a result, a buyer making the choice between pursuing a group
hire or an acqui-hire will find that the acqui-hire offers the opportunity to
obtain potential patent rights, but the group hire does not.
Finally, the start-up’s investors may have claims to future patent
applications. These claims will again be based on invention assignment
agreements. Invention assignment agreements are often not limited to
inventions for which patent applications are filed during the course of
employment; instead, they reach any inventions produced while the employee is at the firm, so long as the other requirements of the agreement
are met.97 These agreements enable the start-up to plausibly contend that
any patent claiming an invention related to the technology that was being
developed at the start-up and naming one of its former engineers as an
inventor in fact belongs to the start-up.
As an example, imagine that a start-up is working on a new algorithm for recommending products to members of a user’s social group.
While at the start-up, the engineers conceive of the invention. It is not,
however, ready for commercialization. In order to delay starting the
clock on the patent term (which is measured from the day the application

94. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 295 (stating that acqui-hires usually occur between seed
funding and a Series A round or between a Series A and a Series B round).
95. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500
(2001).
96. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013) (“Applications for patent . . . shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.”).
97. See FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reasoning
that inventor would have “had nothing to give to [the plaintiff] and his purported assignment to [the
plaintiff would be] a nullity” if the inventor had been subject to a valid invention assignment agreement with his prior employer and if he had invented the subject matter of the patent in suit while he
was still working for his prior employer).
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is filed),98 the start-up does not file for a patent while the team continues
to refine the commercial product that will incorporate the invention. Facebook, which is working on similar projects, decides to add the startup’s team of engineers via a group hire; whatever rights the start-up’s
investors held in the engineers’ work therefore remained with the investors. One year after Facebook hires the engineers, it is prepared to launch
a commercial product incorporating the invention, and files for a patent
to protect it.
Facebook’s decision to pursue a group hire instead of an acqui-hire
will now make this patent vulnerable. The start-up’s investors, who were
left in the lurch when the engineers left via a group hire, can sue to obtain ownership of the patent on the grounds that the invention falls within
the terms of the invention assignment agreement the engineers had
signed with the start-up.99 Even if the investors do not sue, Facebook’s
ownership of the patent is still uncertain. If it seeks to sue a third party
for infringement, the accused infringer can defend on the basis that Facebook does not own the patent.100
Therefore, in order to ensure that it can use the start-up’s future patents, Facebook must obtain from the start-up the rights stemming from
the invention assignment agreements. It can do so with an acqui-hire; it
cannot do so with a group hire. In sum, because investors have viable
claims to existing and potential patents covering inventions produced by
the team of engineers, a buyer interested in obtaining both the start-up’s
engineers and its patents will have to do so by pursuing an acqui-hire
instead of a group hire.
This provides the basis for a hypothesis for a preliminary investigation. If buyers are interested in the patents, then we should see them consistently obtaining them when they complete acqui-hires. If buyers are
indifferent to the patents, then we should see them sometimes flowing to
the buyer and sometimes not. And if buyers view the patents the same
way they view all of the start-up’s other assets—that is, as worthless—
then we should see the patents remaining with the start-up. Accordingly,
98. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2013) (providing that a patent term “shall be for a term . . . ending
20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States”).
99. See, e.g., Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., 109 F.3d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (remanding to state court plaintiff-inventor’s claims for rescission of an invention assignment agreement).
100. See, e.g., Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., 320 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant can contend plaintiff does not have standing to sue because it does not have valid
title to the patent); FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1571 (accused infringer argued that the plaintiff did not
have standing to sue because it “lacks title to the patent” by virtue of an agreement to assign the
invention to the government).
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to get some preliminary traction on the question of whether patent rights
affect the decision to pursue an acqui-hire instead of a group-hire, I examined the frequency with which existing, pending, or future patent
rights changed hands in a set of transactions.
In order to identify a set of acqui-hires for analysis, an initial list of
transactions was produced using the Crunchbase.com acquisition database. 101 Crunchbase.com is a crowdsourced database compiling information about start-ups. 102 The database includes, among other things,
data on funding events and acquisitions. The acquisitions in the database
include acquisitions of different kinds, including acqui-hires, although
they are not so labeled. There are a total of 11,389 acquisitions in the
database, of which 11,360 have a date listed.103 Although the earliest acquisition dates back to 1960, over 10,000 of the 11,360 dated acquisitions occurred on or after January 1, 2007.104
The analysis here is limited to acquisitions completed between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2012. The January 1, 2011 start date was
chosen because of the slowdown in venture capital activity during the
2008 through 2010 financial crisis, 105 and because by mid-2011, the
acqui-hire trend had become sufficiently prevalent to warrant treatment
in the New York Times, making it likely that a significant number of
acqui-hires could be identified that year.106 The December 31, 2012 end
date was chosen because the PTO ordinarily maintains the confidentiality
of patent applications for eighteen months.107 As a result, many applications filed since January 1, 2013 and assignments involving them would
101. CRUNCHBASE, http://crunchbase.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). A current version of
the database can be downloaded here: http://info.crunchbase.com/about/crunchbase-data-exports/.
102. About, CRUNCHBASE, http://info.crunchbase.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
103. These numbers are as of July 31, 2014. The database from that date is on file with the
author.
104. These numbers are as of July 31, 2014. The database from that date is on file with the
author.
105. Press Release, Thomson Reuters & Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Venture Capital Funds
Raised $8.9 Billion During First Quarter 2014 for Strongest Fundraising Quarter Since 2007 (Apr.
14, 2014), available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download
&gid=1049&Itemid=93 (showing decrease in number of funds and dollars raised by venture capital
firms in 2008, 2009, and 2010).
106. See Miguel Helft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest to Corral Young Talent, N.Y.
TIMES (May 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/technology/18talent.html.
107. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2013) (providing that applications will be kept confidential subject to
subsection (b)); 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2013) (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, applications will be published “after the expiration of a period of 18 months”). The period can be extended if the applicant certifies to the PTO that it will not seek patents on the technology in other
countries. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2013). Also, confidentiality ends the moment the patent is
issued, so the period will be less than eighteen months for those patents issued more quickly than
usual.
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not be found in the PTO’s assignment database.108 There were a total of
3,106 acquisitions in the Crunchbase.com database for this time period
(1,426 acquisitions in 2012, and 1,680 acquisitions in 2011).109
In order to identify plausible acqui-hires, I focused on acquisitions
conducted by the following large technology companies (the number in
parenthesis refers to the number of acquisitions by that company in the
Crunchbase.com database for the relevant time period): Amazon (8),
Apple (4), Facebook (22), Google (40), Groupon (19), Microsoft (8),
Twitter (12), and Yahoo! (4). A total of 117 transactions met these criteria.
Lastly, I determined whether the acquisition was an acqui-hire by
researching whether major technology media outlets110 (1) explicitly described the transaction as an acqui-hire, or (2) described the transaction
as primarily motivated by the acquisition of talent. Because the acquihire is defined in part by the buyer’s motivations, about which only the
buyer truly knows, one cannot conclusively determine whether a particular transaction was an acqui-hire. Using these criteria produced a list of
42 likely acqui-hires and 21 possible acqui-hires. 111 These 63 transactions formed the basis for analysis. The remaining 54 transactions were
deemed not to be plausible acqui-hires.
In order to obtain information about patents and applications, I relied on the PTO’s publicly searchable database.112 The PTO also maintains a publicly searchable database of assignments.113 It includes infor108. Exceptions to this would include applications that were granted in less than eighteen
months.
109. CrunchBase Data Exports, CRUNCHBASE, http://info.crunchbase.com/about/crunchbasedata-exports/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
110. Websites searched for this purpose were ALL THINGS D, http://allthingsd.com (last visited
Oct. 21, 2014); GIGAOM, http://gigaom.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); and TECHCRUNCH,
http://techcrunch.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
111. A transaction was classified as an acqui-hire when the media reports strongly indicated
that the transaction was motivated by the desire to acquire the talent. A transaction was classified as
a possible acqui-hire when media reports were unclear about the motivation for the transaction, but it
seemed likely that the talent was a primary, if not the only, motivation. A transaction was excluded
from the analysis at this stage if the media reports demonstrated that the buyer was interested in the
start-up’s corporate assets.
112 . To search the PTO databases, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://patft.uspto.gov/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). For instructions on how to use these databases,
see Important Notices, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/
help/notices.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); Full-Text Database Help, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://appft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/help/help.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2014). For more general information, see Search for Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/index.jsp (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
113 . To use the PTO assignment database, see Patent Assignment Query Menu, UNITED
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (last
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mation on assignments of patents and patent applications; it does not include information on assignments of future patent rights (i.e., invention
assignment agreements).114

Patents
Applications

Percent of All Acqui-Hires in Which Start-Up Assigned to Buyer
All
Some
None
9.5%
1.6%
88.9%
(6/63)
(1/63)
(56/63)
15.9%
0%
84.1%
(10/63)
(0/63)
(53/63)
Table 1: All acqui-hires

Table 1 reports, for all 63 transactions, whether the start-up assigned all, some, or none of its patents or applications to the buyer. Of
the 63 transactions, 6 saw the start-up assign all of its patents to the buyer; in 10, the start-up assigned all of its applications to the buyer. In 1
transaction, the start-up assigned some, but not all, of its patents to the
buyer. 56 of the 63 transactions saw no patents transferred to the buyer;
53 of the 63 transactions saw no applications transferred to the buyer. In
most acqui-hires, then, no existing or pending patent rights were part of
the transaction.
Percent of Acqui-Hires Involving Start-up that Owned
Patents or Applications in Which Start-up Assigned to
Buyer
All
Some
None
75%
12.5%
12.5%
Patents
(6/8)
(1/8)
(1/8)
76.9%
0%
23.1%
Applications
(10/13)
(0/13)
(3/13)
Table 2: Acqui-hires in which start-up had patents or applications
Table 2 reports, for transactions in which the start-up had existing
patents or applications, whether the start-up assigned all, some, or none
visited Sept. 30, 2014). For guidance in using the assignment database, see Assignments on the Web,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/products/services/
Assignments_on_the_Web.jsp (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
114 . See Patent Assignment Query Menu, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
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of its patents or applications to the buyer. Of the 63 total transactions,
only 8 involved start-ups that had existing patents. Of those 8 transactions, the start-up transferred all of its patents to the buyer in 6 of them,
some of its patents in 1 transaction, and none of its patents in 1 transaction. The start-up had pending applications in 13 of the 63 total transactions. In 10 transactions, the start-up assigned all of its pending applications; it assigned none of its pending applications in the remaining 3
transactions. The picture here is that when the start-up had some existing
or pending patent rights, the strong tendency was to assign all of those
rights to the buyer.
Percent of Acqui-Hires Involving Start-up that Owned
Patents in Which Start-up Assigned to Buyer
All
Some
None
66.7%
0%
33.3%
Acqui-hire
(2/3)
(0/3)
(1/3)
Possible
80%
20%
0%
acqui-hire
(4/5)
(1/5)
(0/5)
75%
12.5%
12.5%
Total
(6/8)
(1/8)
(1/8)
Table 3: Acqui-hires in which start-up owned existing patents
Percent of Acqui-Hires Involving Start-up that Owned
Pending Applications in Which Start-Up Assigned to
Buyer
All
Some
None
83.3%
0%
16.7%
Acqui-hire
(5/6)
(0/6)
(1/6)
Possible
71.4%
0%
28.6%
acqui-hire
(5/7)
(0/7)
(2/7)
76.9%
0%
23.1%
Total
(10/13)
(0/13)
(3/13)
Table 4: Acqui-hires in which start-up had pending applications
Tables 3 and 4 separate out the data in Table 2 by acqui-hire and
possible acqui-hire. They show that the picture is roughly the same
whether possible acqui-hires are included or excluded from the analysis.
Including possible acqui-hires increases the rate at which start-ups assign
all of their existing patents from 66.7% (2/3) to 75% (6/8); doing so decreases the rate at which start-ups assign all of their existing applications
from 83.3% (5/6) to 76.9% (10/13). The overall picture remains the
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same: existing patents and pending applications largely follow the engineers from the start-up to the buyer.
Remained with
Start-Up
Patents
15
7
Applications
24
3
Table 5: Assignment by patent and application
Assigned to Buyer

While the prior tables report data by transaction, Table 5 reports data by patent or application. Of a total of 22 patents existing at the time of
the transaction, 15 were assigned to the buyer and 7 remained with the
start-up.115 Of a total of 27 applications existing at the time of the transaction, 24 were assigned to the buyer and 3 remained with the start-up.
To summarize, the start-up had either existing patents or pending
applications in 15 of the 63 acqui-hires or possible acqui-hires.116 In 11
of those 15 transactions, the buyer obtained all of the seller’s existing
patents or pending applications. In 2 of the 15 transactions, the buyer
obtained some of the seller’s existing patents or pending applications.
And in another 2 of the 15 transactions, the seller retained all of its existing patents or pending applications.
Principal Listed in Later Application
33.3%
(14/42)
42.9%
Possible acqui-hire
(9/21)
36.5%
Total
(23/63)
Table 6: Acqui-hires in which start-up’s engineers were later named as
inventors on buyer’s patents
Acqui-hire

115. It is possible that some or all of these seven patents did not actually remain with the startup, but were in fact transferred even though the parties did not record the assignment with the PTO.
See infra text accompanying notes 157–60.
116. Note that in some transactions, the start-up had both existing patents and pending applications.
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Table 6 describes the data regarding applications filed after the
transaction. One of the start-up’s engineers was listed as an inventor on a
patent or application filed by the buyer after the transaction in 14 of the
42 acqui-hires and in 9 of the 21 possible acqui-hires; in 23 of the 63
transactions, one of the start-up’s engineers was listed as an inventor on
one of the buyer’s post-transaction patents or applications. These totaled
53 patents and applications in the 42 acqui-hires, and 68 patents and applications in the 21 possible acqui-hires.
In all, in 13 of the 15 acqui-hires in which the start-up owned existing patents or applications, the buyer acquired some or all of those patents and applications. Of the 23 acqui-hires in which one of the startup’s engineers was listed as an inventor on one of the buyer’s posttransaction patents or applications, 7 also involved existing patents or
pending applications; in 16 acqui-hires, the start-up did not own any patents or pending applications at the time of the transaction, but one of its
engineers was listed as an inventor on one of the buyer’s post-transaction
patents or applications. There was only one transaction in which the seller retained all of its existing patents and pending applications and none
of the start-up’s principals had been listed as inventors on one of the
buyer’s post-transaction patent applications.117
These findings support the proposition that it is exceedingly rare in
an acqui-hire for the buyer to treat the start-up’s patent rights the way it
treats all of the start-up’s non-intellectual property assets—buyers do not
allow all of the patent rights to revert to the start-up’s investors.
B. Why Do Buyers Acquire the Start-up’s Patents?
While Coyle and Polsky reject the team-based rationale for the
acqui-hire,118 their interviewees recognize the value of team hiring. The
interviewees note that “one benefit of an acqui-hire is that you get a cohesive team rather than one to two individuals,” and that it “allows you
to get group talent.”119 Similarly, they argue that the acqui-hire “builds
on a sense of purpose among the engineers,” and it allows “you to get a
complete team . . . that already know each other rather than assemble a
team yourself.”120 Thus, even if team value does not completely explain
the choice to use an acqui-hire because group hiring is possible without it
117. One of the start-up’s engineers was later named as an inventor on one of the buyer’s patents in one of the two transactions in which the start-up did not transfer any of its existing patents or
pending applications.
118. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 302.
119. Id. at 294 n.40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 294 n.41 (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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(and not inevitable with it), the widespread recognition of the value of
team hiring reveals that participants are aware of the team production
problems technology start-ups face and the need to look for solutions to
them. This suggests that one possible explanation for the unique treatment accorded to patents in an acqui-hire is that patents may play a role
in facilitating the buyer’s acquisition and subsequent management of a
team of engineers.
In this section, I will first describe the team production problems in
the context of software and similar technology start-ups. I will next explain the role that patents may play in mitigating those problems. I will
then conclude with some implications of the analysis for understanding
the acqui-hire.
1. Team Production in Technology Start-Ups.
Recall that team production scenarios are those in which two or
more inputs combine to produce joint output.121 In these scenarios, the
inputs are likely to suboptimally invest in the production process to the
extent that the following four problems are present. First, investment
may be unobservable; it may be difficult for one team member to determine whether another team member is investing sufficient resources.122
Second, effort may be nonverifiable; it may be impossible to demonstrate
to an outsider, like a court, whether a team member is complying with
contractual commitments to exert a certain amount of effort.123 Third, the
output may be nonseparable; it may be difficult to determine the extent to
which the total output value is attributable to each of the separate inputs.124 Finally, the output may be uncertain ex ante; it may be hard to
know in advance how much the team as a whole could produce if none of
the team members shirked.125
Software and other technology start-ups likely face these team production problems.126 In these entrepreneurial firms, several programmers
must combine their efforts in order to create a new product. Like other
ventures that rely primarily on human intellectual effort, the production
of software and similar technology is hard to observe or verify. It is unlikely that any one programmer can easily determine whether another
121. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 249.
122. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1700.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Merges, supra note 15, at 20–22 & nn.68–71 (describing the prevalence of team production problems in research and development generally).
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programmer is thinking about how to most efficiently code a particular
routine (as opposed to, for example, what she will have for lunch);
whether that programmer is saving brilliant algorithms for her next project and using just “good enough” algorithms for this one; or whether
that programmer’s inability to complete her piece of the project is due to
her own subpar efforts or to the inadequacy of another’s contribution. It
seems equally unlikely that the programmers could predictably demonstrate any of these things to a court. Moreover, in part because the product will be new, it will be hard to know in advance how much it will be
worth. Finally, once the project is complete, it will be hard to determine
the percentage of the total output each programmer is responsible for.
The combination of these factors means that technology start-ups
are susceptible to shirking, and that the shirking is difficult to control
through ordinary contractual mechanisms. Ex ante sharing rules (e.g.,
each engineer is entitled to a percentage of the total profit) do not solve
the problem because each engineer’s reward only partially depends on
her own effort; this means that each engineer has an incentive to shirk
because she retains all of the benefits of shirking while bearing only
some of its costs.127 Ex post distribution of the surplus will be susceptible
to wasteful rent-seeking efforts as the team members haggle over a fixed
pie.128
The team production literature suggests that managers can help
solve these problems in at least two ways. First, they might be monitoring experts, specializing in detecting difficult to observe investments.129
Second, they might be enforcement specialists, ensuring that team members will be punished (or rewarded) if their joint output fails to meet (or
exceeds) some threshold.130 In order to fill these roles, managers must,
among other things: (1) not contribute nonseparable inputs to the joint
production process; and (2) own the residual claim to the team’s output.131

127. Id. at 22; Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 266.
128. Merges, supra note 15, at 22.
129. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1695–96; Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781–85 (1971).
130. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1696–99; Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams,
13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 326–30 (1982). See also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi G. Zingales, Power in a
Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998).
131. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1706, 1712.
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2. Patents as (Partial) Solutions to Team Production Problems.
Patents can help a manager supervise a team production process.132
By statute, patents are treated like personal property and can be assigned
by contract.133 An invention assignment agreement can grant the manager
the patent rights to any inventions produced by the team.134 As Professor
Robert Merges explains, this mechanism makes it possible for the manager—who has not contributed to the inventive process—to obtain the
residual claim to the team’s output.135 The prerequisites of team production management are therefore in place. The precise function patents perform in a given context will vary depending on whether the team production process is organized around a manager performing a monitoring role
or an enforcement and punishment role.
Managers who perform monitoring roles typically must invest significant resources in learning about the particular inputs to the production
process.136 A manager might, for example, be better able to monitor the
team’s progress if she knows which programmer is a perfectionist and
which excels at discovering quick and dirty solutions. The problem is
that the manager will typically have to reveal at least some of this kind of
information to the team members. And once the team members themselves know about their strengths and weaknesses, they could plausibly
capture that value by replacing the manager.137 In this scenario, the first
manager faces the same problem that all producers of information face:
the person who invests in developing information finds it difficult to capture the returns to that investment because the information it produces is
nonexcludable.
Patents can encourage managers to invest in the learning process
required of a team production manager because a patent grants its owner
the right to prevent downstream researchers from incorporating the orig-

132. The arguments here parallel those made in the copyright context in Casey & Sawicki,
supra note 9.
133. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012); FilmTec v. Allied-Signal, 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Stanford v. Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011) (“[A]n inventor can assign his rights in an invention
to a third party.”).
134. Merges, supra note 15, at 7–10.
135. These contracts are, however, imperfect because team members might be able to evade
them if they leave the firm early enough. See id. at 46–47 (explaining how an inventor can avoid
employer ownership of an invention by leaving the firm “after one arrives at the general notion of an
invention, but before any of the provable milestones of invention arrive”).
136. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1734–36.
137. The new manager will not have invested in developing the information about the team,
while the first manager will have made that investment. All else equal, the new manager should
therefore agree to manage for less than the first manager would accept.
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inal invention into their improvements.138 This right increases the costs
of defection relative to a scenario in which there are no patents because
leaving the patent-owning manager would leave the manager with a potential veto on the work of the defecting engineer(s) to the extent that
those engineers wanted to continue working on related projects. As a
result, if a team wants to produce an invention and retain the ability to
create (and fully profit from) any improvements to that invention, they
will most cheaply be able to do so by working with the same manager.
Managers who perform enforcement or punishment roles (as they
do when their expertise lies in reducing uncertainty) need to be able to
break the budget constraint—they need to be able to pay rewards out of a
pot that is not limited to the value created by the team in the initial project. 139 Again, the blocking patent rule facilitates the role of the team
production manager. Because the owner of a patent on an invention is in
a blocking position with respect to creators of improvements to that invention, the patent owner can raise or lower the costs of participating in
efforts to improve an invention. When the manager is the patent owner,
she has the ability to reward teams that succeed by permitting them to
participate in efforts to improve the invention, and the ability to punish
teams that fail by prohibiting them from participating in efforts to improve the invention. To the extent that the value of those improvements
comes from projects distinguishable from the initial project, it is the kind
of value that the manager can use to elicit effort in the initial project.
In addition to these management-facilitating functions, patents may
also reduce transaction costs associated with team production in ways
described by Professor Paul Heald. First, when a firm uses patents to
substitute for trade secrets as tools to protect information from competitors, it no longer needs to spend money on the elaborate mechanisms required to maintain trade secret protection; those mechanisms, like preventing information sharing among team members and monitoring compliance with confidentiality agreements, are particularly costly in team
production contexts.140 Second, patents allow managers to monitor team
members by measuring their contributions to the firm’s patent portfolio.141 Finally, patents facilitate team production across firms by clarifying the scope of the information asset over which the firms are contract138. See generally Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) (describing how patent law’s blocking
patent rule enables holders of upstream patents to extract value from downstream improvers).
139. Holmström, supra note 130, at 327–28.
140. Heald, supra note 15, at 487–88.
141. Id. at 491–93.
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ing. 142 If patents are able to reduce contracting costs when firms are
transacting over information produced by a team, it is also plausible that
patents similarly reduce contracting costs when firms are transacting
over the movement of the team members themselves.
3. Patents and Team Production in Acqui-Hires
It is therefore at least possible that patents facilitate the organization
of team production. Buyers in acqui-hires are looking in part to capture
the value created by this particular team of engineers, rather than an
equivalent number of individual engineers. Because existing and future
patents covering inventions produced by the team while at the start-up
can help the buyer keep the team together, buyers will plausibly place a
higher value on the start-up’s patents and future patents than will others
(including the start-up’s investors).
Combined with the start-up’s viable claims to those patents and future patents, the buyer’s higher valuation provides a reason to pursue an
acqui-hire rather than a group hire: the acqui-hire is a mechanism for
ensuring that present and future patent rights follow the team. Of course,
patents fulfill several functions, and some of them may overwhelm the
value of team management. In those instances, patents may stay with the
start-up or move to the buyer for other reasons. Still, in at least some situations, the team management function of patents may be sufficiently
valuable that it pushes a firm towards an acqui-hire and away from a
group hire.
The data also helps alleviate some tension in the Coyle and Polsky
explanation of the acqui-hire. Buyers will ordinarily want to keep the
engineers for as long as possible. That is why the compensation pool is
usually structured to include time-vested options—they are meant to discourage the engineers from leaving.143 Of course, there are limits on the
buyers’ ability to persuade engineers to join them and to stay on board;
buyers presumably would not want to keep an unhappy engineer. Still,
the buyers are generally interested in hiring (and retaining) talented engineers.
Yet one of the key advantages to the acqui-hire in the Coyle and
Polsky story is that it increases the odds that the investors will back the
engineers in a subsequent venture.144 The goal of the deal consideration
pool—the dollars sent by the buyer to the investors rather than to the en142. Id. at 489–91.
143. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 297–99.
144. Id. at 314–17.
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gineers—“is simply to pay off the investors so the entrepreneurs can obtain . . . reputational benefits.”145 While some of those reputational benefits have only intrinsic value (e.g., engineers will feel good about themselves if they demonstrate loyalty to the investors who helped them start
the venture), arguably the most important reputational benefit of the
acqui-hire is that the investors will be more likely to back the engineers’
subsequent ventures and recommend to other investors that the engineers
are a good investment.146 All else equal, structuring the transaction as an
acqui-hire rather than a group hire therefore makes it more likely that the
engineers will leave the buyer to found another start-up as soon as feasible. So it is at best a mixed blessing for the buyer to attract the engineers
through a transaction that facilitates their eventual exit.
The data presented here helps reduce this tension. Buyers might
pursue acqui-hires rather than group hires not only to appease engineers,
but also because they transfer assets to the buyers—namely, existing and
future patents—that make it easier for the buyers to keep the entire teams
together and that make it harder for engineers to leave, even after their
options vest and other inducements to stay or restrictions on leaving expire.
C. Cautionary Notes
Much remains to be done in understanding the intersection of intellectual property and team production. There are important reasons to be
cautious in drawing conclusions about the relevance of patents to these
transactions. Most critically, relatively few of the acqui-hired start-ups
had any patent rights to speak of. Only about one-quarter of the start-ups
(15 of 63) had either existing patent rights or pending applications.147 But
when future patents listing the start-up’s principals as inventors are included, nearly half of the transactions (31 of 63) could be driven in part
by patent considerations.148 Therefore, whether the data shows that patent
rights influenced one-quarter of the transactions or one-half of them depends on whether the acqui-hire in fact affects rights to patents arising
from applications filed after the acqui-hire.
There are at least two reasons why that may not be the case. First,
the start-up’s investors may not have plausible claims to the patents filed
by the buyers naming the start-up’s founders as inventors. Those claims
would be based on invention assignment agreements that grant the start145. Id. at 332.
146. Id. at 312–22.
147. See supra text accompanying note 116.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 116–18.
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up the rights to inventions produced by employees during the term of
employment and within the scope of their work.149 Such claims would
not be viable if the post-transaction patents relate to technology different
from the technology developed at the start-up. The work done at the
start-up may also simply have been too preliminary to reach the patentable stage. And even when it appears that the inventor acted strategically
in leaving the firm just before proof of conception, courts are reluctant to
enforce these agreements and grant the rights to the firm; departing employee-inventors tend to win.150
Second, even if there were viable claims, that would not mean that
the investors would bring them. Venture capitalists are reluctant to pursue legal claims against their entrepreneurs.151 Even though these sorts of
claims to future patents could be directly adverse to the buyers instead of
the engineers, they would nonetheless still involve those engineers as
witnesses and discovery targets.152
Additional transactions between the parties may also undermine the
patents’ ability to play team-preserving roles. As at least some acqui-hire
participants have suggested, the buyer might obtain the patents and then
grant back to the investors a “nonexclusive, perpetual royalty free license
to use” them.153 This could permit engineers who do not want to join the
buyer to remain at the start-up at lower cost than would be the case if the
start-up could no longer use the inventions produced by the team. Still,
the start-up cannot use patents to manage the team the way the buyer
could because, as a nonexclusive licensee, the start-up will not have
standing to sue alleged infringers 154 and therefore will not be able to
stake out a blocking position with respect to improvements on the patented technology.155 These licenses are not publicly available; accord149. See supra text accompanying notes 97–100.
150. Merges, supra note 15, at 48–52.
151. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 307–10.
152. See id. at 310 n.109 (reasoning that entrepreneurs may still respond negatively if the investor sues a buyer for claims arising out of the entrepreneurs’ departure, even if the entrepreneurs
are not named in the suit, because the entrepreneurs will still be involved as key witnesses in the
litigation).
153. Id. at 293 n.38.
154. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1030–35 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that nonexclusive licensee did not have standing to sue third party for infringement).
155. As between the buyer (who as the owner of the patent can sue third parties for infringement) and the start-up (who as the nonexclusive licensee cannot sue third parties for infringement),
only the buyer has a blocking position with respect to third parties. In other words, an engineer who
wishes to work on an improvement without the buyer’s consent can only work at the buyer or the
start-up; an engineer who wishes to work on an improvement without the start-up’s consent can
work anywhere. This means that the buyer will likely still better manage the team than the start-up.
However, when these licenses are in place, the buyer’s relative advantage will be somewhat weak-
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ingly, the data here does not reflect the extent to which the investors can
still use inventions covered by the patents acquired by the buyer.
On the other hand, there are at least four reasons why this data may
understate the importance of patents to the acqui-hire. First, the PTO
may still be keeping confidential some of the pending applications. Although patents are ordinarily made public after 18 months, that period can
be extended if the applicant certifies to the PTO that she will not be seeking patents covering the technology in other countries.156 Software firms
like the ones at issue in most acqui-hires may conclude that the benefits
of continued secrecy outweigh other considerations. As a result, some
applications may be pending beyond the standard eighteen-month period
and are therefore still confidential even for transactions taking place between 2011 and 2012. If so, then the data here does not include all applications for the identified transactions.
Second, some assignments may not be recorded. There is no requirement that patent assignments be recorded in the PTO database.157
Doing so avoids the possibility that the assignee will lose her claim to a
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value,158 so it would seem unlikely
that sophisticated actors like the ones engaged in these transactions will
fail to record their assignments. But the conventional wisdom is that
many assignments are not recorded in the database, perhaps because parties to patent transactions ordinarily conduct significant due diligence
and include contractual mechanisms to deter fraudulent transfers.159 As a
result, some of the patents designated here as not assigned may in fact
have been assigned.
Third, the search for subsequent applications filed by the buyer after the transaction only looked for those naming one of the start-up’s
principals as the inventor; because the entire roster of a start-up’s engineers is not publicly accessible, it is not possible to search for the names
of all the potential inventors on patents to which the start-up’s investors
have plausible claims. It seems likely that other engineers that moved
ened because it can no longer preclude the engineers who prefer to stay at the start-up from working
on the technology.
156. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, applications will be published “after the expiration of a period of 18 months”). The period can be extended
if the applicant certifies to the PTO that it will not seek patents on the technology in other countries.
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2012).
157. Graham et al., supra note 83, at 1274 n.60.
158. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“An assignment . . . shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgage for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent
and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.”).
159. Graham et al., supra note 83, at 1274 n.60.
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from the start-up to the buyer would contribute patentable inventions to
the buyer following their move. If they did, then the buyer may have
sought an acqui-hire in part to ensure that it received those patent rights.
Finally, it is possible that the start-up’s engineers, who have only
moved to the buyer in the last two or three years, are still working on
developing technology that has not yet reached the stage at which a patent application would be viable. The buyers in this data set may later file
applications arising from the transactions at issue (or have filed applications that are still within the standard eighteen-month period of confidentiality), even if they have not yet done so.
Moreover, the data may understate the importance to the acqui-hire
of intellectual property generally, as opposed to patents specifically.
Much of the valuable intellectual property produced by these start-ups
will take the form of trade secrets. Trade secrets can include nontechnical
business information (e.g., customer lists and pricing strategies) and
technical information like improved programming algorithms.160 Silicon
Valley software start-ups appear to prefer trade secrets to patents, in
large part because trade secrets are much cheaper to obtain.161
If the start-ups are relying on trade secrets, then that form of intellectual property may still be pushing buyers to pursue acqui-hires. Even
in California, former employees are not free to use their former employer’s trade secrets. While the state does not apply the inevitable disclosure
doctrine to prohibit a former employee who had access to trade secrets
from working for a competitor at all, it does apply ordinary trade secret
misappropriation principles that may expose a former employee (and his
new employer) to liability for misuse of the start-up’s trade secret information.162 The start-up’s investors could therefore have plausible trade
secret claims to assert against the buyer if they are unhappy about the
engineers’ decision to leave via a group hire.163 To the extent the relevant
intellectual property takes the form of trade secrets, rather than patents, it
would not be visible in this data. And there is no comparable public database of trade secret transactions as there is for patents, making it difficult to access the relevant information.
Coyle and Polsky recognize the potential viability of trade secret
misappropriation claims, but downplay them on the grounds that the in-

160. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
161. Graham et al., supra note 83, at 1290–93, 1313–14.
162. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 304.
163. These kinds of claims are, however, difficult to assert with much confidence. See Merges,
supra note 15, at 47 n.159.
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vestors would never pursue them.164 What they overlook is the possibility
that the trade secrets have team-specific value. If the buyer obtains those
trade secrets, it can use them to continue to bind the team together, and
the acqui-hire gives the buyer the opportunity to obtain them while a
group hire does not. Unlike the investors, the buyers in these transactions—large technology firms like Google—do sue former employees for
misappropriation of trade secrets. 165 As a result, the buyer’s ability to
obtain the start-up’s trade secrets may also help explain the choice to
structure the transaction as an acqui-hire.
IV. CONCLUSION
The acqui-hire is still a novel phenomenon, and it is possible that it
will remain a relative rarity in the world of corporate transactions. One
implication of the analysis here is that if the acqui-hire spreads, we
should expect to see it in industries focused on technology development.
Unless the desired employees are primarily developing patentable technology (or information that could be protected as a trade secret), the opportunity to obtain team-preserving intellectual property rights through
an acqui-hire does not offer the buyer an incremental value over simply
adding the employees via a group hire. This could therefore partially account for the absence of acqui-hiring in, for example, the legal profession,
where teams of attorneys are frequently hired as a group but without an
acquisition.166
Furthermore, we might conclude from here that the acqui-hire is
more like an ordinary corporate acquisition than the conventional wisdom suggests. While the media and the legal academy view these as talent-driven transactions for which the seller’s assets are irrelevant, it may
be more accurate to see these transactions as reflecting a shift from an
industrial-age economy—in which the assets of interest are tangible
things like factories and machines—to an information age economy—in
which the assets of interest are intangible things like patent rights. To say
that the assets of interest are patent rights is not the same thing as saying
that the buyer is interested in the “talent,” or human capital, of the startup. Instead, it is the relationship between that talent and particular (intangible) complementary assets that makes the purchase of the start-up
164. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 305–06 (recognizing that the “investors could allege
that the poaching company and the defecting engineer colluded to misappropriate the startup’s trade
secrets”), and 307–10 (arguing that Silicon Valley lawyers’ culture makes it unlikely that unhappy
investors would sue their former entrepreneurs).
165. See, e.g., id. at 309 n.107.
166. See id. at 301–02 (describing prevalence of group hiring of lawyers).
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attractive, in much the same way that corporate acquisitions in the industrial age may have been influenced by the relationship between the human capital of a firm’s employees and the particular tangible complementary assets (e.g., machines and factories used by those employees).167
Much empirical work remains to be done. The cautionary notes
sounded above could be at least partially resolved by survey work. 168
Additional data may help confirm or reject the possibility that intellectual
property rights affect the choice to use the acqui-hire. For example,
Coyle and Polsky predict that over time, a “money back for the investors”
rule of thumb will determine the allocation of dollars between the compensation pool and the deal consideration pool. 169 But if intellectual
property is a critical asset driving buyers to acqui-hires, then there should
not be a generic rule of thumb guiding the allocation of dollars, which
will instead be determined by the idiosyncratic value of intellectual property obtained in particular cases.
Finally, I have not yet said much about the corporate law angle to
this analysis. The engineers in an acqui-hire move from a closely-held
firm to a large public corporation. It is possible that they are doing so in
part because they need a mediating hierarch to facilitate their interaction
with other (non-engineer) team members, and the public company’s
board is better positioned to fill that role than other options. If so, then
patents might be viewed as facilitating the movement of employees
across corporate structures. These, and surely many other issues, remain
to be resolved by future research.

167. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1770–71 (1989) (explaining how firms can use ownership of physical assets to obtain
some control over complementary human capital).
168. See generally Graham et al., supra note 83 (reporting results of a survey of technology
entrepreneurs that was designed in part to fill gaps left by empirical work focusing on publicly accessible and private databases).
169. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 332–36.

